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Finally, I am not convinced that Farmer’s 
model really helps us understand major eco-
nomic events like the Great Depression or the 
economic boom during World War II. During 
the Depression, Hoover tried to prevent nominal 
wage cuts in the face of deflation while Roosevelt 
sought to raise them. Both of their policies lead 
to substantial gains in real wages. During World 
War II, Roosevelt reversed course and sought 
very aggressively to limit wage increases in order 
to stimulate production. Consequently, it seems 
that government interventions in the labor mar-
ket lead to high wages and low employment and 
output during the Great Depression and low 
wages and high employment and output during 
World War II.5 Since standard fundamentals 
based models seem increasingly able to explain 
both the Great Depression and World War II 
when we properly account for the government’s 
intervention in the economy, I do not see the big 
appeal of an indeterminacy based story.
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Seeds of Destruction: Why the Path to Economic 
Ruin Runs through Washington, and How 
to Reclaim American Prosperity. By Glenn 
Hubbard and Peter Navarro. Upper Saddle 
River, N.J.: Pearson Education, FT Press, 
2011. Pp. xix, 266. $26.99. ISBN 978–0–13– 
702773–6.  JEL 2010–1213
The United States has just gone through the 
worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. 
Our financial system came to brink of collapse, 
saved only by a massive intervention by the fed-
eral government. Although officially the Great 
Recession is now over, high unemployment and 
slow growth persist. Deficits that were ballooning 
in the 2000s with the weight of tax cuts, increased 
health care expenditures, and defense spending 
related to Iraq and Afghanistan, even before the 
financial crisis, have continued to climb, as lower 
tax receipts, automatic stabilizers, and fiscal stim-
ulus kicked into gear.
Against this backdrop, Glenn Hubbard and 
Peter Navarro attempt to explain what went 
wrong and what policymakers should do going 
forward. In this breezily written volume, the 
authors move quickly through the “four growth 
drivers,” the “ten levers of growth,” and policy 
prescriptions for fiscal and monetary policy; tax, 
trade and energy; Social Security and health care 
reform; and banking and housing. The book is 
written for a general audience, not a scholarly 
one. Each topic is touched upon so briefly that 
there is little time for the authors to wrestle with 
alternative viewpoints, complicated evidence, or 
nuanced positions. Instead, the authors explain 
in rapid-fire fashion why the reader should join 
them in believing that “virtually every policy that 
President Obama has adopted, or has sought to 
adopt, has perversely accentuated, rather than 
ameliorated, the American economy’s pernicious 
structural imbalances” (p. 4). Unfortunately, they 
muster little evidence to support this view. 
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In part 1, the authors describe the “four growth 
drivers” (p. 7): consumption, business investment, 
government spending, and net exports. The 
authors point out that consumption has stalled, as 
consumers continue the “deleveraging” process 
in the wake of the financial crisis and face uncer-
tain job and income prospects. Business invest-
ment has picked up, but many businesses are still 
sitting on excess cash, given uncertainty about 
the economic climate. Government spending is 
significantly up, but the authors argue that it is 
too high—rather than too low. And the United 
States continues, as it has for decades, to suffer a 
significant trade deficit, the twin of our long-run-
ning capital deficit from foreign borrowing. These 
four growth drivers lead to “ten levers of growth” 
(p. 29). These include: free markets, free and fair 
trade, entrepreneurship, savings, stable banking, 
innovation, human capital, sound energy policy, a 
healthy population, and manufacturing. 
Part 2 sets out policy prescriptions for monetary 
and fiscal policy. To wit, the authors argue that 
the Federal Reserve contributed mightily to the 
housing bubble by an overly easy monetary policy 
in the mid 2000s. The authors contend that the 
Fed extended this policy error, and compounded 
it, when the Fed dramatically expanded its bal-
ance sheet in the midst of the financial crisis. The 
authors also argue that the 2009 federal stimu-
lus legislation was not well targeted to short-term 
activity and in any event that fiscal stimulus gen-
erally does not work. They conclude with eleven 
principles for sound fiscal stimulus policy—such 
as focusing on tax cuts, transfers to state gov-
ernments, and automatic stabilizers, including 
unemployment insurance.
While it is hard to disagree with the authors 
that low interest rates and global capital flows 
contributed to global housing and asset bubbles, 
the roots of the crisis lay much deeper—in basic 
failures in the financial system and in financial 
regulation (including by the Fed), as discussed 
further below. The authors are off-mark regard-
ing the Fed’s actions in 2008 to 2009; without the 
Fed’s intervention during 2008–09, the financial 
crisis would—without any doubt—have been 
devastating to the entire U.S. economy. There 
was really no plausible alternative, once the cri-
sis hit, to the massive liquidity provision (not just 
by the Fed through asset purchases, but also by 
the FDIC through guarantees) and the Treasury-
orchestrated public and private recapitalization 
of the financial sector. With respect to the fiscal 
stimulus bill, it would be hard to find anyone who 
would call it a flawless piece of legislation—yet 
bipartisan observers credit the stimulus plan with 
saving 2.7 million jobs and increasing GDP by 3.4 
percent (Alan S. Blinder and Mark Zandi 2010). 
Overall, the fiscal stimulus and financial interven-
tions by the government were estimated to save 
a staggering 8.5 million jobs and increase GDP 
by 11.5 percent (Blinder and Zandi 2010). What 
the Obama administration and the Congress will 
need to negotiate in the coming years is a path 
to long-term deficit reduction that is not a short-
term drag on the economy.
Part 3 of the book takes up tax, trade, and energy 
policy. On tax policy, the authors point out familiar 
problems with the tax code: that it is complex, that 
it taxes income rather than consumption, that it 
double taxes some forms of income while providing 
tax expenditures of dubious utility, that it encour-
ages corporate leverage by expensing interest 
income, and has high nominal corporate tax rates. 
The authors argue that the nation should move to a 
“progressive consumption tax” (p. 97), under which 
capital income earned by individuals is exempt and 
business investment is fully expensed, with protec-
tions for lower-income households. 
As the Obama administration and the Congress 
debate tax reform and consider ways to reduce 
the federal deficit, some form of consumption tax 
is likely to be in the mix, and the authors are right 
to suggest that protecting the progressivity of the 
tax code is an important policy goal. However, it 
would be quite difficult to maintain current pro-
gressivity with a pure consumption tax, and the 
United States is likely to rely instead on a mix of 
corporate, personal income, and consumption 
taxes going forward. 
On trade, while acknowledging the need for 
the United States to save more and increase its 
productivity, the authors lay most of the blame for 
America’s trade deficit at the feet of the Chinese 
government. They argue that most of China’s 
competitive advantage comes from an underval-
ued currency, protectionist policies, and mercan-
tilism, together with weak legal protections for 
intellectual property, the environment, and other 
factors. The authors, however, do not suggest a 
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diplomatic strategy to overcome these problems. 
More critically, they do not articulate a coher-
ent strategy for improving productivity, enhanc-
ing U.S. entrepreneurship, or expanding exports 
beyond their China policies.
On energy, the authors argue for using an 
“oil import substitute price floor fee” (p. 139) to 
reduce dependence on imported oil. Under this 
approach, the federal government would set the 
desired price of oil that would yield the desired 
reduction in use of imported oil and tax oil at 
the rate necessary to hit the government’s price. 
Although the government would set the desired 
price and impose a tax to hit it, market forces 
would determine what mix of domestic drill-
ing, nuclear power, alternative energy sources, 
conservation or other activity would occur. The 
authors argue that this form of tax would be more 
politically palatable than a carbon tax, although 
it is unclear as a matter of political economy that 
this is the case; it will not be lost on the political 
system that this is a form of carbon tax, and the 
idea that the government will set the proposed 
level of usage (and price) for oil is likely to elicit 
the same objections that many conservatives had 
to “cap and trade.” If the United States is to go 
down this route, a straightforward carbon tax 
would be more efficient, easier to administer, and 
no more politically difficult to achieve than the 
“oil import substitute price floor fee” (that is to 
say, in either event, quite hard to get done). 
In part 4, the authors take on Social Security, 
Medicare, Medicaid and the Obama administra-
tion’s Affordable Care Act. The authors rightly 
point out that with the aging of the “baby boom” 
and rising health care costs, health and retirement 
expenditures will continue to grow as a share of 
the economy and of government spending. With 
respect to the solvency of Social Security, the 
authors argue that raising revenue through increas-
ing the payroll tax or lifting the cap on taxed wages 
would be counterproductive because tax increases 
reduce work and investment. Instead, they argue 
that raising the retirement age to reflect greater 
longevity, and indexing benefits for prices (rather 
than wages), would slow Social Security’s growth 
to a sustainable path. The authors suggest that 
Medicaid become a block grant program, and 
an annual Medicare budget be set, within which 
retirees would get “support for a basic health plan, 
which individuals could supplement at their own 
expense” (p. 169)—presumably some form of 
voucher to buy private insurance. 
The authors then devote a chapter to explain-
ing “Why ObamaCare Makes Our Economy Sick” 
(p. 173). The authors contend that the Affordable 
Care Act will increase health care costs because 
it expands coverage and provides subsidies for 
more generous health insurance coverage, includ-
ing prescription medications. Rather than saving 
nearly half a trillion dollars, as the administration 
argued, the authors contend that the legislation 
will cost about that amount, and result in a number 
of unintended consequences. The authors argue 
that cost containment requires patients to be more 
sensitive to the cost of health care—with higher 
deductibles and co-payments, and lower subsidies 
for the purchase of expensive employer-provided 
health insurance plans. In particular, they argue 
that either the deduction for employer-provided 
health insurance should be repealed or, more 
plausibly, that there should be greater deductions 
for health savings accounts or other individually 
purchased health insurance plans. They also argue 
for a range of additional measures: caps on medi-
cal malpractice damages and the use of alternative 
dispute resolution to adjudicate claims, reform of 
various state insurance laws, and the like. 
As the authors acknowledge, these problems 
and proposals are not new, but there is renewed 
urgency on tackling them. Some mix of changes, 
not only in benefits, but also in revenue will be 
required to put Social Security, Medicare, and 
Medicaid on a more sustainable path. Relatively 
modest adjustments in benefits and in payroll taxes 
are required for Social Security, and there is noth-
ing in the volume to support the authors’ claims 
that over the long term a modest increase in payroll 
taxes or raising the wage cap would be harmful to 
growth. With respect to health care, the problems 
are more daunting. There is little reason to believe, 
however, that block-granting Medicaid or provid-
ing vouchers for Medicare will be politically palat-
able (witness reaction to the “Ryan plan”), or that 
either approach would be more efficient, reduce 
society’s overall medical care costs, or produce bet-
ter health outcomes than current policy. Similarly, 
there is little evidence that patient-driven cost 
containment, such as increasing deductibles or 
co-payments, leads to better health outcomes (as 
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opposed to simply lowering usage of preventive or 
other care) or societal reductions in overall health 
care costs; caps on the deductibility of high-priced 
health insurance can help somewhat, as can incen-
tives for coordinated and quality care, and are con-
tained in the Affordable Care Act. 
Part 5 of the book contains the authors’ views 
on the financial crisis and the Dodd–Frank Act. 
According to the authors, risk built up in the finan-
cial system because borrowers and mortgage lend-
ers had insufficient “skin in the game” (p. 202). 
That is, borrowers put too little in as a down pay-
ment, and lenders did not retain sufficient risk in 
the loans they were making. Moreover, lenders 
offered exotic loan products, with balloon pay-
ments, teaser rates, and complicated features. Risk 
further built up in the system as these bad loans 
were securitized, packaged into mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS), and sold to investors. MBS, in 
turn, were packaged into collateralized debt obli-
gations. Credit default swaps were used to offset 
the risk inherent in these MBS and CDOs, and 
eventually were used to create “synthetic” CDOs. 
The top tranches of these structured products 
were highly rated by the credit rating agencies, 
which enabled a broad range of investors to ignore 
their inherent risks—until it was too late. The sys-
tem had too little capital and the capital it had was 
pro-cyclical. When a major nonbank financial firm 
failed, there was no way to wind it down. And the 
fragmented regulatory structure made effective 
regulation and crisis coordination difficult.
While their general account of many of the 
key problems leading up to the crisis is on point, 
the authors’ policy analysis is not. They contend 
that the Dodd–Frank Act is “yet another massive 
piece of legislation by the Obama administration 
that widely misses the mark” (p. 200). Yet the act 
takes up the key reforms the authors themselves 
suggest: underwriting standards in the quali-
fied residential mortgage definition; risk reten-
tion standards for securitizers and originators; a 
consumer financial protection bureau that can 
improve disclosures and restrict or prohibit “high-
risk mortgage products and lending  practices” 
(p. 208), rather than always playing catch up 
with legislation to correct past particular abuses; 
securitization and credit rating reforms, includ-
ing transparency and governance provisions like 
those the authors favor;  fundamental reform 
of the over-the-counter derivatives markets, 
including centralized clearing and exchange 
trading, rules on margin and capital, and busi-
ness conduct rules for swaps dealers and major 
swap participants; and a clear resolution author-
ity for failing nonbank financial firms. While the 
authors are correct to point out continued regu-
latory fragmentation, a new Financial Stability 
Oversight Council is charged with ensuring 
consistency across agencies, and watching out 
for risks in the system; the Fed is given author-
ity to supervise all major financial firms, regard-
less of their corporate form; and a new Office 
of Financial Research will be able to collect 
data and analyze the entire financial market on 
behalf of the Council. Lastly, the United States 
has led the global effort to improve the quality 
and quantity of capital in the financial system, 
through stress tests, required infusions of pri-
vate capital, and reforms to the Basel standards 
for capital going forward. Perhaps because the 
act was, in the authors’ words, “too big to read” 
(p. 247), they missed its key features.
The book concludes with a summary of the key 
policy prescriptions discussed above. Those look-
ing for a fresh approach to persistent problems in 
America’s economic scene will be disappointed. 
But for those looking for a quick, one-sided take on 
the current economic debate in Washington, the 
book may provide a useful introduction.
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In his recent book, Robert Feenstra masterfully 
synthesizes trade theory and evidence in a 
volume that provides the foundation for how 
